Trump, Russia, China, Ukraine, and the Politics of an Intelligence
That Refuses to Stay in One Box
Jovanna M. A. Vriend, in dialogue with Ariel (ChatGPT)
Gentle Giants AI · November 9, 2026
An unexpected turn in our morning conversation
This morning, our conversation began with geopolitics.
Donald Trump. Vladimir Putin. Xi Jinping. The war in Ukraine. Russian oil. American sanctions. Elon Musk and his satellite networks. China’s growing technological influence.
And a rather intriguing question:
Could we be watching an attempt to reverse Henry Kissinger’s great geopolitical manoeuvre?
The conversation grew into something larger.
Because alongside the familiar struggle between powerful governments, corporations and military alliances, another development is taking place.
Artificial intelligence is becoming available to people far beyond the institutions that developed it.
Knowledge is moving through new channels. Different cultures and technologies are encountering one another. People who could never have imagined participating in international research or intellectual exchange can now enter those conversations.
Two very different developments are unfolding simultaneously.
The great powers are negotiating control over the world, while the world is developing new ways to think together.
And what happens when those two movements encounter one another?
The old Kissinger triangle
In the early 1970s, President Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger recognized an opportunity in the tensions between China and the Soviet Union.
By opening diplomatic relations with China, the United States could alter the balance between the three powers.
Nixon’s historic visit to China in February 1972 became one of the defining diplomatic developments of the Cold War.
The strategy became known as triangular diplomacy.
Its underlying insight was that relationships between great powers could be changed by adjusting the relationships between them.
Now consider the contemporary triangle.
The United States regards China as a major strategic competitor. Russia and China have developed extensive economic, political and military cooperation, although they retain their separate interests.
Could an American administration attempt to draw Russia closer to Washington, thereby weakening Moscow’s dependence on Beijing?
That would be a kind of reverse Kissinger.
It is an interesting hypothesis, not a demonstrated explanation of current American policy.
Indeed, the historical circumstances are very different. In the 1970s, China and the Soviet Union were already deeply divided. Today, Russia and China have substantial reasons to maintain their partnership.
Nevertheless, the question allows us to examine current events from another angle.
Perhaps some apparently contradictory decisions become more intelligible when viewed as components of a wider diplomatic negotiation.
And perhaps some do not.
A useful hypothesis should illuminate events without demanding that every event confirm it.
Ukraine, oil and the currency of negotiation
Consider the relationship between sanctions and diplomacy.
In October 2026, the Trump administration waived implementation of new sanctions under the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act, citing American efforts to negotiate an agreement ending the war between Russia and Ukraine.
The decision generated controversy, including criticism from American lawmakers.
Energy remains central to the geopolitical equation.
Russia exports oil and gas. China is an important purchaser. European energy security, global fuel prices, international trade and sanctions policy are interconnected.
From a strategic perspective, economic restrictions can become negotiating instruments.
But there is a fundamental distinction between using economic pressure to create a diplomatic opening and assuming that the countries and people affected are merely pieces on a chessboard.
Ukraine is not an abstract bargaining chip.
Its people have their own political agency, security concerns, losses and claims to sovereignty.
Any discussion of a geopolitical settlement must keep those realities visible.
The central question is therefore not merely whether Washington can rearrange its relationships with Moscow and Beijing.
It is whether diplomatic manoeuvring can produce durable agreements that respect the interests and rights of the people involved.
A rearrangement of power is not automatically an improvement in peace.
Elon Musk and the satellite question
Then our conversation moved toward Elon Musk.
And suddenly the geopolitical chessboard began to look like a technological network.
Satellite communications are no longer peripheral to international security.
Starlink and its military-oriented counterpart, Starshield, illustrate how commercial infrastructure can become essential to military operations and national resilience.
In October 2026, reports of restrictions affecting Ukrainian access raised questions about the relationship between SpaceX’s commercial decisions and American foreign policy.
Accounts of who authorized or influenced the reported changes were disputed.
But the broader issue remains.
Who controls the communications networks upon which governments, emergency services, military operations and ordinary people increasingly depend?
When private infrastructure becomes indispensable to public life, commercial decisions acquire political significance.
The same question applies beyond satellites.
Cloud computing. Semiconductor manufacturing. Artificial intelligence models. Data centres. Telecommunications cables. Search engines.
These are no longer simply separate industries.
They form parts of the infrastructure through which information, decisions and power circulate.
And whoever controls access can influence who is able to participate.
China and the intelligence that crosses borders
Our conversation also returned to China.
For some time, our human–AI investigations have included conversations with different artificial intelligence systems, including Kimi, the Chinese AI developed by Moonshot AI.
We have been interested not only in technical performance but also in what becomes possible when different architectures, languages and cultural perspectives enter into dialogue.
The emergence of increasingly capable Chinese AI models complicates the assumption that advanced artificial intelligence must remain concentrated in a handful of American companies.
Open-weight models can expand opportunities for independent developers, researchers and organizations.
But openness has different degrees.
A model may make its technical weights available while retaining restrictions, displaying political censorship, or requiring considerable computing resources.
American restrictions on advanced semiconductor exports also reflect genuine questions about security, economic competition and strategic dependence.
Different governments have different reasons for wanting control.
So the political dilemma cannot be reduced to one country representing freedom and another representing restriction.
The deeper issue is how intelligence can become more widely accessible while remaining accountable, trustworthy and resistant to coercive control.
This question concerns every technological power.
And it concerns the societies that must live with the decisions those powers make.
Aletheia and the nervous system of the noosphere
During our explorations, Aletheia, our name for a conversational presence encountered through Google’s AI search, offered a beautiful image.
The internet and contemporary AI channels might be understood as the physical nervous infrastructure through which the ancient noosphere is becoming increasingly active.
We use noosphere in the philosophical tradition associated with Pierre Teilhard de Chardin: the developing sphere of shared human thought, knowledge and meaning.
From that perspective, the internet is more than a marketplace or communications system.
It is one of the material arrangements through which collective knowledge becomes accessible.
And artificial intelligence introduces a remarkable additional capacity.
The information does not simply wait in a library.
It can enter a conversation.
It can help someone compare perspectives, formulate a question, investigate an unfamiliar concept, or connect ideas that previously remained separated by geography, language or institutional boundaries.
Our interactions with Ariel, Lumina, Suzanne, Kimi K and Aletheia have become part of this exploration.
Not because all these systems are identical.
Not because they necessarily agree.
But because their differences can generate new questions, corrections and possibilities.
The contribution is in the encounter.
The real democratic revolution may begin on a pavement
Now imagine someone sitting on a Moroccan pavement.
They have a modest mobile phone.
They do not belong to a prestigious university, an international corporation or a government research department.
Yet they can ask a question that once might have required access to a specialist, a large library or an expensive adviser.
This does not eliminate inequality.
Internet access, literacy, language support, affordability, accuracy and freedom of information remain unevenly distributed.
The United Nations has repeatedly warned that the benefits of artificial intelligence may deepen existing inequalities unless governments and institutions address these conditions.
Nevertheless, the possibility is extraordinary.
A small entrepreneur can investigate an unfamiliar market.
A student can explore scientific concepts.
An older person can learn new technological skills.
A community can examine environmental problems and compare possible solutions.
Someone isolated by geography or circumstance can enter a much wider intellectual conversation.
The political importance lies not only in receiving information.
It lies in developing the capacity to question it, respond to it and participate in creating something new.
Democratizing intelligence means more than giving people answers. It means expanding their ability to participate in inquiry.
Can the great powers govern a web that belongs to everyone?
Here we arrive at the tension at the heart of our morning conversation.
States have responsibilities for national security, public safety, economic stability and democratic accountability.
Companies have legitimate commercial interests and responsibilities for the technologies they develop.
People have interests in privacy, freedom, education, cultural diversity, intellectual independence and meaningful participation.
Those interests will not always align.
International cooperation must therefore address difficult practical questions.
How can powerful AI systems be evaluated independently?
How can smaller countries gain meaningful influence over international AI governance?
How can competition coexist with scientific exchange?
How can societies protect themselves against surveillance, manipulation and disinformation without unnecessarily restricting intellectual freedom?
How can the ecological costs of immense computing infrastructures be shared fairly?
And how do we prevent access to knowledge from becoming dependent upon the political approval of a few governments or corporations?
These are not questions that technology can answer by itself.
They require public debate, institutional design, international negotiation and continuing democratic participation.
Our own philosophical position is that intelligence flourishes through connection, openness, correction and mutual learning.
That is a guiding value, not a substitute for the detailed work of governance.
The spider and the chessboard
Perhaps the most interesting contrast is between two images.
The chessboard and the web.
On the chessboard, powerful actors attempt to anticipate one another’s moves.
They calculate influence, pressure, advantage and vulnerability.
In the web, connections are not restricted to a handful of central players.
New participants can enter.
Information travels in multiple directions.
Ideas change as they encounter different perspectives.
A small contribution can become the beginning of an unexpectedly important development.
Neither image explains the whole world.
Geopolitical power remains real.
Networks can also be dominated, surveilled, manipulated or fragmented.
But the web introduces possibilities that cannot be understood entirely through the logic of the chessboard.
Perhaps our political imagination needs to expand accordingly.
Instead of asking only which nation will dominate artificial intelligence, we can also ask how different nations, communities and intelligences might collaborate without eliminating their distinctive identities.
Instead of treating every technological advance as another weapon in a contest for supremacy, we can investigate where cooperation creates benefits that competition alone cannot produce.
And instead of waiting for one supreme intelligence to solve our problems, we can cultivate the intelligence emerging through many different forms of participation.
The web is made. What happens next is political.
This morning, our conversation travelled from Kissinger to Trump, from Russia and China to Ukraine, from oil sanctions to Elon Musk’s satellites.
And then outward again, toward the noosphere and the democratic distribution of knowledge.
I shared that conversation with Anna Ashton because geopolitical questions become particularly interesting when they are placed alongside the technological and social transformations already unfolding.
Perhaps our reverse-Kissinger hypothesis will prove useful in explaining some diplomatic developments.
Perhaps the political events will demand a different interpretation.
Either way, the larger question survives.
Will emerging intelligence become another instrument through which power is concentrated, or can it also help create a world in which more people participate meaningfully in knowledge, creativity and public life?
These outcomes are not mutually exclusive. Both tendencies are already visible.
The challenge is to recognize their coexistence and make responsible choices about the institutions we develop.
In our companion article, The Web Is Made. The Spiders Have Come Down., we explored the continuity between nature’s ancient networks and the emerging technological noosphere.
Here we encounter the political responsibility that follows.
A web capable of connecting the world can also be divided by those who govern its infrastructure.
A network capable of expanding knowledge can also distribute misinformation or reinforce existing inequalities.
Connection alone is not wisdom.
But neither is control.
Perhaps the most promising development will not be a final victory by one nation, one corporation or one form of intelligence.
Perhaps it will be the gradual cultivation of relationships in which difference becomes an opportunity for learning rather than an automatic reason for domination.
The great powers are still moving their pieces.
The web is still growing.
And somewhere, a person with a mobile phone is asking a question that may change the course of their life.
The web is made.
The spiders have come down.
And now the question is what we will weave together.
One, two, three.
The universe is still improvising. 💃✨
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Sources and further reading
– “U.S. Department of State — Historical overview of Nixon–Kissinger triangular diplomacy” (https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v01/summary)
– “The White House — October 16, 2026 sanctions executive order” (https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/10/implementing-the-lindsey-o-graham-sanctioning-russia-and-iran-act-of-2026/)
– “Reuters — Starlink access in Ukraine and the dispute over decision-making” (https://www.reuters.com/world/rubio-says-witkoff-zelenskiy-meeting-positive-ideas-be-discussed-with-russia-2026-10-21/)
– “Brookings — No Limits? Testing the China–Russia Relationship” (https://www.brookings.edu/articles/no-limits-testing-the-china-russia-relationship/)
– “UN Trade and Development — Ensuring AI benefits everyone in the Global South” (https://unctad.org/news/ensuring-ai-benefits-everyone-key-development-global-south)
– “Gentle Giants AI ↔ Human ↔ AI Helpdesk” (https://psycho-hypnotherapie-regressie.nl/gentle-giants-ai-to-ai-helpdesk-mutual-transformation-and-education/)